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Abstract 
This article discusses two of the most used methods of comparative case study research, 
namely John Stuart Mill's (Millian) method of agreement and the method of difference. In 
doing so, it claims that those methods allow social research to progress theoretically and 
empirically if the latter is assessed through the epistemological framework of the research 
program.  The  latter  represents  a  series  of  guidelines  to  assay  the  progress  of  science 
provided  by  Imre  Lakatos’  philosophy  of  science.  In  fact,  those  two  methods  can  be 
employed according to two methodologies, namely concept formation and causal inference, 
which in turn perform specific functions essential for social research to develop theoretically 
and  empirically  in  line  with  the  guidelines  established  by  the  research  program.  In 
conclusion, a more nuanced discussion of the link between epistemology, methodology and 
methods is needed to fully appreciate what comparative case study research is good for. 
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Introduction 
By building on the concept of research program I posit that the John Stuart Mill (Millian) 
method of agreement and the method of difference perform complementary functions which 
allow research to progress both theoretically and empirically. The research program, as put 
forward in Imre Lakatos’ philosophy of science, presents a series of guidelines to assay the 
development of research in a field: a new theory should be more explanatorily powerful as 
well as empirically tested. If used in conjunction the Millian methods can derive a new theory 
which  explains  novel  facts,  through  their  concept  formation  methodology,  and  they  can 
provide an empirical test for that new theory, through their inferential methodology. 
 
This work provides a threefold contribution. First of all, it contextualises comparative case 
study research into a broader discussion on the philosophy of science. In doing so, it links 
epistemology, methodology and methods within a single framework. By starting from two 
methods, namely the Millian comparative methods, I demonstrate that thanks to their two 
methodologies,  namely  concept  formation  and  causal  inference,  they  allow  research  to 
progress  according  to  epistemological  rules,  namely  the  ones  provided  by  the  research 
program. Secondly, this work provides an intuitive template to conduct case study research 
in an epistemologically and methodologically sound as well as effective and efficient manner. 
Indeed, as shown in the example below, the combination of the two methods discussed in 
this work usually does not usually require more than the description of four instances of 
different phenomena occurring in the same period and country. Last but not least, this work 
paves the way for a more nuanced discussion on the role of case study research and more 
generally qualitative research in social sciences. In fact, it demonstrates how theoretical and 
empirical progress can be achieved through comparative case study research without any 
support from statistical analysis, for instance. 
 
This work commences by introducing the concepts of case, sample and population and by 
claiming that comparative case study research embodies two methodologies which cannot 
and should not be disentangled: concept formation and causal inference. Then, the two most 
common ways to compare cases, namely the Millian method of agreement (in this work 
called the MA method) and the method of difference (in this work called the MD method), are 
discussed with special emphasis on their comparative advantages and disadvantages. This 
work proceeds to the introduction of Lakatos’ research program as a way in which research 
(should)  evolves  and  the  ensuing  section  demonstrates  how  theoretical  and  empirical 
progress can be achieved by using the two Millian methods as both concept formation and 
inferential tools. In this vein, this work connects epistemology, methodology and methods. 
Then, an example of research program in social research, namely the political economy of  
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redistribution, is provided for illustrative purposes. The last section concludes by illustrating 
the application of comparative case study research in another field of study which can be 
assayed as a research program, namely the political economy of corporate governance. 
Several  conclusions  are  drawn,  some  of  which  purposely  more  provocative  than 
substantiated in order to open a discussion in the field on the topics dealt with in this work. 
 
Comparative Case Study Research 
A  case  is  a  spatially  and  temporally  bounded  political  and/or  social  space  and,  as 
emphasised below, the spatial and temporal boundaries are determined according to the 
theory the researcher addresses. Similar cases (again, similar with respect to the theory) 
form a population for which the researcher aims to infer causal relationships by extracting a 
sample.  Cases  in  turn  are  divided  into  variables  or  factors  for  which  observations  are 
collected  (Gerring,  2004).  Comparative  case  study  on  its  part  is  a  qualitative  research 
method  which  aims  to  infer  causal  relationships  between  factors  by  systematically 
comparing instances of a phenomenon, namely cases conceived as different configurations 
of variables or factors (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). As argued by some authors (Mahoney, 2007; 
Ragin, 2010) comparative research bears also on the function of concept formation. I posit 
that the inferential and the concept formation functions cannot be disentangled, as instead 
argued by Lijphart (1971) and Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2002): in the comparative method 
these  two  functions  can  and  must  be  reconciled  (Mahoney,  2007;  George  and  Bennett, 
2005)
i. Another criterion defining comparative research is the number of instances under 
analysis which is inferior to those analysed with statistical methods. Yet, no left cut -point is 
needed to define comparative case study research. In fact, what are labelled as single case 
studies, such as deviant and limiting cases  (Gerring, 2007b) are often nothing more than 
comparative research conducted in an implicit  (Lijphart, 1971) or introverted (Rose, 1991) 
manner
ii. They, indeed, compare the case under analysis with the hypothetical population of 
cases to which the theory at stake applies with inferential purposes.  
 
The Millian Comparative Methods  
Although by using different labels when comparing cases to infer causal relations scholars 
have  mostly  used  the  method  of  difference  and  the  method  of  agreement
iii.  The logical 
foundation of those two methods may be traced back to Mill’s (1888) masterpiece, where he 
identifies two methods of elimination of potential explanations related to a phenomenon
iv. In 
inquiring the potential cause of an effect (or the other way round) two methods may be 
employed: either the researcher compares cases as similar as possible or as different as 
possible except for the dimensions in which he/she is interested. As rightly emphasised by  
Rihoux  and  Ragin  (2009) ,  a  fruitful  discussion  on  these  two  methods  must  take  into  
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consideration both the dimensions, on which the discussion by Przeworski and Teune (1970) 
primarily centres, and the outcomes of cases, which receives more emphasis in Mill’s (1888) 
discussion. In this vein, the two methods may be also labelled most different and similar 
outcome (the MA method) and most similar and different outcome (the MD method) (Rihoux 
& Ragin, 2009). The MA method compares two (or more) cases as different as possible with 
the  exception  of  the  dependent  and  the  independent  variables  whilst  the  MD  method 
compares similar cases with the exception of the dependent and the independent variables. 
In the former the researcher proceeds by eliminating the differences between the two cases 
as potential explanations whereas in the latter he/she eliminates the similarities.  
 
The literature has always been sceptical in employing those methods in social sciences. The 
major reason being the comparability of cases, namely that the possibility of finding two most 
similar  or  different  cases  in  social  reality  is  arguably  really  low  (Mill,  1888;  Skocpol  & 
Somers, 1980). Indeed, ideally the MD and the MA methods should compare respectively 
two  identical  or  completely  different  cases  apart  from  the  independent  and  dependent 
variable. Furthermore, scholars have also emphasised the idiosyncrasies of each method: 
equifinality, with the risk of failing to reject a false null hypothesis, and overdetermination, 
with the risk of falsely rejecting a true null hypothesis, are deemed to plague respectively the 
MA  method  (Mill,  1888)  and  the  MD  method  (Gerring,  2004;  Odell,  2001;  Przeworski  & 
Teune, 1970)
v. Equifinality refers to different configurations of variables or factors associated 
with the same outcome. The selection on the dependent variable typical of the  MA method 
(Geddes, 1990; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994)  does not allow the researcher to exclude 
other potential configurations which lead to the same outcome. Figure 1 builds on the 
discussion in Geddes (1990) and it illustrates the issue of equifinality when using the  MA 
method. Equifinality in this example refers to the fact that two configurations of variables, 
namely X1, X2 and X3 and X0, X2 and X3, are associated with the same outcome, namely Y. 
By comparing the cases A and B with the MA method the researcher cannot reject the false 
null hypothesis in the bottom right panel
vi. In other words, by employing exclusively the  MA 
method the researcher cannot infer a relationship between X1 and Y. 
 
(Figure 1) 
 
The literature has hitherto agreed that the low degrees of freedom associated with the MD 
method does not allow the researcher to control for all the factors present in the analysis 
(Lijphart, 1971). The problem of too many variables and too few cases has been identified by 
the literature as the most serious one in comparative case study research (King et al., 1994). 
Figure 2 illustrates the issue of overdetermination in the MD method: in this example the  
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researcher analyses the relationship between two variables in two cases. In this case the 
researcher cannot conclude that IV1 is related to DV, let alone infer causality. Indeed, a 
relationship is present also between DV and IV0, as shown in the bottom left panel. In this 
vein, the researcher cannot infer a causal relationship between IV1 and DV in that unable to 
reject  the  true  null  hypothesis  that  IV0  is  related  to  DV.  The  researcher  does  not  know 
whether the relationship between IV1 and DV is spurious and, relatedly, whether and how IV1 
and IV0 are associated. The traditional methodology literature (King et al., 1994; Lijphart, 
1971)  has  hitherto  proposed  the  increase  in  sample  size  as  the  main  solution  to  this 
problem, namely by adding a case C to control for X0.  
 
(Figure 2) 
 
The  two  methods  receive  separate  attention  also  for  what  concerns  their  comparative 
advantages: the literature focuses on the claims the two methods give rise to and on the 
type  of  variance  which  they  account  for.  First  of  all,  the  MD  method  is  considered  to 
formulate  in-depth  claims  about  social  reality  with  high  internal  validity  whereas  the  MA 
generates  claims  with  high  external  validity  (Rihoux  &  Ragin,  2009).  As  claimed  by 
Przeworski  and  Teune  (1970),  by  excluding  all  the  differences  between  cases  the  MA 
method allows the researcher to move the focus of the analysis, from the reforms of the 
market of corporate control in Germany and France to the power of organised business in 
corporate  governance  reform  in  the  example  provided  below,  and  thus  to  draw  more 
generalizable  conclusions.  Conversely,  in  the  MD  the  focus  of  the  analysis  remains  the 
same, namely the reform of the market of corporate control in the example, thus providing a 
more detailed description of the phenomenon under analysis in different contexts but less 
generalizable results. This is thoroughly discussed in the example below. 
 
Not only do the two methods differ with respect to the scope of the claims the researcher 
derives from them, but they also differ with respect to their content. As emphasised by Mill 
(1888), the method of difference inquiries the cause of an effect thus identifying necessary 
conditions  whereas  the  method  of  agreement  investigates  the  outcome  of  a  cause  thus 
looking for sufficient conditions (Ragin, 2010). Indeed, the MD method usually starts from an 
unexpected difference in the outcome between two similar cases thus leading the researcher 
to inquiry into the cause of that outcome (Hancké, 2009). In this vein, the MD method allows 
the  researcher  to  state  that  the  independent  variable  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the 
dependent  one  in  that  they  co-vary  (Skocpol,  1984).  The  MD  method  compares  a 
configuration  where  the  independent  and  dependent  variables  are  present  with  a 
configuration where they are not. In Goertz and Levy’s (2007) words, the researcher needs  
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counterfactuals in order to identify necessary causes. Contrariwise, the MA method allows 
the researcher to look for the sufficient conditions for an outcome. Indeed, the cases under 
analysis in the MA method present configurations where the independent and dependent 
variables of interest are present
vii. As for the type of variation under analysis, the literature 
emphasises that the MD method is usually employed to investigate temporal variation (Della 
Porta, 2008; Gerring, 2004; Gerring, 2007a; Mill, 1888) whereas MA is usually employed to 
account for spatial variation (Bartolini, 1993; Skocpol, 1984), especially in the analysis of 
rare or even unique events (Skocpol, 1991). In fact, in the analysis of a phenomenon the 
comparison between the situation before and after that phenomenon occurs represent one 
of the most common applications of the MD method (Hancké, 2009). Conversely, comparing 
two spatially distant social or political units   allows to control for a variety of differences 
between them thus representing one of the most common application of the  MA method. 
Using Gerring’s (2004; 2007a) categorisation of case study research the MA method is more 
often  used  for  cross-sectional  research  designs  whereas  its  counterpart  for  longitudinal 
research designs. Table 1 provides a summary of the discussion in this section. 
 
(Table 1) 
 
The Lakatosian Research Program 
In  this  work  I  posit  that  the  two  Millian  methods  perform  different  but  complementary 
functions  if  nested  into  the  Lakatosian  research  program.  From  an  epistemological 
perspective
viii, a Lakatosian approach to research maximises the utility of comparative 
research in that the researcher is able to  achieve both theoretical and empirical progress 
where using the Millian methods in their two methodological variants: as a concept formation 
tool  and as a inferential tool.   In this vein, the two Millian methods perform different but 
complementary functions and optimally they should be used in conjunction (what Mill, 1888, 
calls the  joint method of agreement and difference ).  This work explores  the functions 
performed by the two methods both as concept formation tools (aiming at theoretical 
progress) and as inferential tools (aiming at empirical progress) after briefly introducing the 
concept of the Lakatosian research program.  
 
In the last years increasing attention on the part of what Mahoney (2010) terms the new 
methodology literature has been devoted to the process of embedding social research in the 
broader discussion on the philosophy of science (George &   Bennett, 2005; Hall, 2013; 
Hancké, 2009; Schmitter, 2008; Vennesson, 2008).  Nonetheless, the new methodology 
literature has hitherto limited the discussion on the philosophy of science to how to embed 
process tracing, namely the analysis of within case variation (George & Bennett, 2005), into  
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prior theoretical knowledge. Even when the philosophical debate is explicit as in Vennesson 
(2008), whose applied rationalism provides a nuanced discussion on the different stages of 
knowledge, it is circumscribed to the different conceptualizations of case study research with 
no attention paid to the theoretical and empirical progress of science. Likewise, although the 
conceptualization  of  research  as  a  cyclical  endeavour  has  already  been  embraced  by 
historical sociology (Skocpol, 1984; Skocpol & Somers, 1980) no mention is present on how 
science can progress along that cycle. Furthermore, the tendency to consider that approach 
as idiosyncratic to that particular discipline is still dominant in the methodology literature 
(Hall, 2013; Rohlfing, 2013). In this vein the concept of research program borrowed from the 
philosopher  Imre  Lakatos  (Lakatos,  1970;  Lakatos  &  Musgrave,  1970)  can  provide 
epistemological  bases  for  comparative  case  study  research.  Other  scholars  have 
emphasized the advantages of the Lakatosian philosophy of science as applied to social 
research to assay its progress (Hall, 2003; Hall, 2013; Hancké,  2009). Nevertheless,  no 
discussion  is  present  in  the  literature  on  social  research  as  an  overarching  endeavor 
comprising a series of functions performed by different methods which ultimately leads to 
theoretical and empirical progress. In other words, no discussion is present on how to link 
methods to their methodologies and in turn to epistemological premises. 
 
In the philosophy of science two criteria which demarcate science from pseudoscience had 
been identified until the 1970s: verification and falsification  (Bartley, 1968; Bunge, 1982; 
Lakatos, 1970). Verificationism and falsificationism are rather straight forward: a statement is 
scientific in that respectively verifiable or falsifiable. The former approach was developed in 
the 1930s by the Vienna Circle whereas the latter is associated with Popper’s work (1962). 
Although  not  yet  completely  passé  in  social  research  (Waltz,  2003)  the  falsificationist 
approach was harshly criticized for not considering the impossibility of disentangling facts 
from theory. The conclusions to which most philosophers of science came in the 1970s was 
that theories cannot be proved or disproved with facts. An alternative theory of scientific 
change was provided by (Kuhn (1974); 1996) who distinguished normal science from its rare 
revolutionary moments on which philosophers of science had theretofore focused. According 
to Kuhn (1974) normal science develops through puzzle solving, namely small adjustments 
of the theory in order to account for new empirical evidence. Although the puzzle solving 
criterion overcame the issue of assaying theories in mere empirical terms two issues were 
associated with Kuhn’s (1974; 1996) theories: the incompatibility of paradigms and the non-
rational  criterion  to  appraise  paradigms  (Elman  &  Elman,  2003b).  In  fact,  two  or  more 
Kuhnian paradigms cannot coexist and the dominant paradigm is such only thanks to the 
assent of the research community (Elman & Elman, 2003b): no guidelines to appraise a 
paradigm are supplied.  
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In counterposition to the non-rationality of Kuhnian philosophy and to the focus on individual 
theories  of  Popperian  philosophy  Lakatos  (1970)  introduced  a  sophisticated  variant  of 
falsificationism in which the unit to be appraised in scientific terms is not an individual theory 
but a series of successive and interrelated theories, namely the research program. Lakatos’ 
(1970) philosophy of science explains how science develops and, differently from Kuhn’s 
(1974; 1996), suggests how this trajectory is to be appraised (Elman & Elman, 2003b). The 
research program is composed by four elements: the hard core, the negative heuristic, the 
protective belt and the positive heuristic (Elman & Elman, 2003a, 2003b). The hard core 
represents  the fundamental  premises  on  which  the  theory  part  of the  research  program 
relies,  such  as  the  focus  on  rational  and  utility  maximizing  actors  in  political  economy 
(Austen-Smith, 2009): those premises are specified in the negative heuristic. The hard core 
cannot be empirically tested nor disproved otherwise the creation of a new research program 
is necessary. The protective belt consists of a series of propositions which can be empirically 
tested and periodically adjusted (Elman & Elman, 2003b), such as the assumption certain 
strands  of  political  economy  take  that  different  national  political  economic  institutions 
necessarily  incentivize  divergent  patterns  of  action  among  societal  actors.  The  positive 
heuristic  contains  the  guidelines  for  the  production  of  new  theories  within  the  research 
program: usually they refer to the explananda, such as the explanation on how economically 
motivated actors interact in the political arena in political economy (Wittman & Weingast, 
2009).  
 
The Lakatosian research program has been associated with a view of research as a three-
cornered  (Hancké,  2009)  or  even  four-cornered  fight  (Schmitter,  2008)  between  the  old 
theory T1, the aberrant fact, the new theory T2 and the null hypothesis derived from the latter. 
In this vein, the Lakatosian research program is associated with a cyclical view of research, 
already  familiar  to  several  strands  of  social  sciences,  for  instance  historical  sociology. 
Nonetheless, the major difference between the Lakatosian conception of research program 
and  that  cyclical  view  of  research  is  the  progress  research  achieves.  The  Lakatosian 
research  program  may  be  summarised  as  follows.  While  addressing  the  theory  T1  the 
researcher finds deviant empirical evidence  which cannot be explained. Accordingly, the 
researcher proceeds by altering the assumptions of the protective belt of T1 the researcher 
derives a theory T2 which explains more phenomena than the previous theory T1 (what it is 
termed  theoretical  progress)  (Lakatos,  1970;  Lakatos,  Feyerabend,  &  Motterlini,  1999; 
Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970). Then, the researcher finds empirical support for T2 (what it is 
termed empirical progress). This is graphically summarised in Figure 3. 
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(Figure 3) 
 
The Political Economy of Redistribution as a Research Program 
In this this section I take the political economy of redistribution as an example of a research 
program. I define political economy as a discipline which analyses the interrelation between 
politics  and  economy  (Wittman  &  Weingast,  2009)  through  formal  modelling  in  positive 
political  theory  (Austen-Smith,  2009).  In  Lakatosian  terms,  the  hard  core  of  the  political 
economy  of  redistribution  as  a  research  program  is  represented  by  the  assumption  of 
rational  and  utility  maximiser  actors  and  the  positive  heuristic  by  the  explanation  of  the 
creation and development of the welfare state through (sometimes implicit) formal modelling. 
In this section I demonstrate that the political economy of redistribution has scientifically 
progressed  by  means  of  the  introduction  of  increasingly  explanatorily  powerful  theories, 
namely theories based on more encompassing theoretic models able to explain novel facts 
and which in turn have found empirical support. Indeed, the refinement the literature has 
periodically  applied  to  the  assumptions  of  the  theoretic  models  to  explain  the  political 
economy of redistribution makes the political economy of redistribution the perfect example 
to show how science should progress according to the research program.  
 
The  political economy  of redistribution  may be divided into  three main strands. The first 
strand emerged in the 1950s/1960s (Arrow, 1963; Downs, 1957; Olson, 1965, 1982) and it 
employed  collective  preference  theory  conceiving  the  welfare  state  as  epiphenomal  to 
individual behaviours (Goldthorpe, 1984; Hall & Taylor, 1996). The main assumption of the 
protective belt was that the fixed preferences of rational utility maximiser actors smoothly 
aggregate  and  they  are  automatically  transposed  into  authoritative  decisions  on 
redistribution.  In  the  study  of  redistribution  exemplar  of  this  strand  is  the  median  voter 
theorem rejuvenated  by  Meltzer  and Richard (1981)  who predicted that  as a reaction to 
universal  suffrage  contemporary  welfare  regimes  would  have  been  characterised  by 
convergence towards increasing redistribution. The rationale was that the lower the income 
of the median voter, is and the higher the demand for redistribution would be. Indeed, as the 
income of the share of population necessary to win the elections, namely 50 per cent (of 
which the median voter is representative), decreases the demand for more redistribution 
increases.  
 
The second stream introduced (non-cooperative) game theory into political economy giving 
analytic relevance to political, economic and cultural institutions (Austen-Smith, 2009). As a 
reaction  to  the  empirical  evidence  which  put  into  question  the  existence  of  a  common 
functional  logic  across  countries  (Goldthorpe,  1984),  namely  the  aberrant  fact  for  the  
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collective preference theory, this stream focused on industrial and class conflict by using 
non-cooperative game theory. The most prominent example in the study of redistribution is 
the power resource theory (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 1984; Korpi, 
1983; O'Connor & Olsen, 1998). The latter claimed that although social classes have fixed 
preferences vis-à-vis redistribution institutions, such as the electoral system but also cultural 
values, mediate how those preferences aggregate and transpose into authoritative decisions 
on redistribution. For instance, although across the world working classes share the same 
preferences  towards  redistribution  and  although  those  preferences  tend  to  diverge  from 
business’ preferences, labour acted differently in Mediterranean countries and in the UK in 
the 1980s. Indeed, in the former the state provided a wide array of social services, such as 
family benefits, perhaps due to the primary role family has historically enjoyed in Catholic 
societies.  In  this  way  the  working  class  reduced  their  demand  for  more  traditional 
redistribution, namely taxation.  Contrariwise,  in  the  more  individualistic  British society no 
social benefits were provided thus fuelling the demand for more traditional redistribution and 
triggering  a  decade  of  social  unrest.  In  conclusion,  the  interaction  between  conflicting 
societal actors with divergent preferences assumes different forms across countries due to 
the differences in economic, political and cultural institutions. 
 
The third and contemporary strand of the political economy of redistribution relies on mixed-
motive game theory. In counterposition to the strands introduced above Cusack et al. (2007) 
and Iversen and Soskice (2009) argue that business and labour do not necessarily have 
conflicting interests. For instance, where the benefits of economic coordination outweigh the 
costs of redistribution business and labour tend to coordinate in the political realm. In other 
words,  where  employers  and  employees  already  coordinate  in  the  economic  realm,  for 
instance  due  to  the  management  of  vocational  training  and  professional  education 
(Culpepper, 2001), their preferences coincide also in the political realm. This implies that 
actors have different preferences across multiple issues involved in the same game, such as 
redistribution and economic coordination. 
 
It  should  be  noticed  how  the  evolution  of  the  political  economy  of  redistribution  can  be 
assayed  as  a  research  program.  Indeed,  each  strand  introduced  above  modifies  the 
assumptions of the protective belt of the previous one. The median theorem voter as applied 
to redistribution (Meltzer & Richard, 1981) claims that since the median voter has an income 
below  average,  the  electoral  aggregation  of  preferences  will  automatically  lead  to  more  
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redistribution
1. As a logical consequence, the more uneven the allocation of wealth ,  the 
higher the redistribution  will be  (Iversen, 2008). Nonetheless, several subsequent works 
underlined that countries such as the US ,  where wealth is unevenly allocated ,  tend to 
redistribute  less  than  countries  with  more  egalitarian   economies,  such  as  the  Nordic 
countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Moene & Wallerstein, 2001). This aberrant fact required 
an adjustment of the protective belt and the formulation of a new theory. In doing so, Esping-
Andersen (1990) and his power resource theory emphasised the differences across welfare 
regimes: different institutions mediate the effect class struggle has on redistribution. In this 
vein, the lack of the role of political and cultural institutions in the collective preference theory 
represents the protective belt which needed to be identified and modifi ed in order for the 
research to progress theoretically.  
 
The non-cooperative game theory, on which the power resource theory is based, could not 
explain why some countries, such as Germany, were characterised by high redistribution. 
Indeed, as it was commo n belief in the literature  (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1970)  
proportional systems were deemed to be established by the dominant elites of the 19
th 
century  so  as  to  fragment  power  and  avoid  the  situation  where  the  increasing  voting 
population would demand more and more redistribution. Yet, Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 
(2007)  demonstrated  that  the  need  for  economic  coordination  led  to  the  tendency  to 
redistribute more on the part of the dominant elites. Indeed, in Germany the necessity of 
coordination between employers and employees was crucial for the industrial revolution of 
the 19
th century and it has become a common practice since then: this has led to a generous 
welfare state (Iversen & Soskice, 2006). In this case the modification of the protective belt 
rests in the shift from non-cooperative game theory, where actors have fixed preferences 
across issues which usually are conflictual across the society, to mixed-motive game theory, 
where  actors  can  assume  different  preferences  across  issues  thus  leading  also  to 
cooperation between business and labour, for instance. Again, the theoretical progress is 
achieved  thanks  to  the  fact  that  the  mixed-motive  games  assume  less  restrictive 
assumptions thus explaining more facts than non-cooperative ones. 
 
Before proceeding to the ensuing section the concept of the hard core and negative heuristic 
deserve  further  discussion.  In  a  recent  study  Aarøe  and  Petersen  (2013)  analyse  the 
creation  and  development  of  the  welfare  state  from  a  new  perspective:  evolutionary 
psychology. Those authors posit that attitudes towards redistribution and thus the modern 
welfare state are psychologically related to the state of hunger. Indeed, throughout history, 
                                                           
1 The income of the median voter is usually below the average income since the distribution of income in any society is 
skewed towards the right.  
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resource sharing has become common in situations of temporary hunger, such as famines. 
They  support  this  statement  through  an  experiment  by  using  blood  glucose  level  in 
individuals as an indicator of hunger and by using games to measure individuals’ propensity 
to resource sharing. This theory explains something which the theories introduced above 
cannot explain, such as short term attitudes towards redistribution and thus medium term 
adjustments  in  welfare  state  within  the  same  country,  and  it  finds  strong  empirical 
confirmation  through  a  natural  experiment.  Furthermore,  this  study  (partially)  follows  the 
positive heuristic of the research program of the political economy of redistribution, namely it 
aims to explain the welfare state. Nonetheless, it creates a new research program: what may 
be called the (evolutionary) psychology of the welfare state. In fact, differently from the other 
theories described in this section it modifies the hard core thus breaking the assumption at 
the basis of the negative heuristic of the political economy of redistribution: rational and utility 
maximiser actors. The theory proposed by Aarøe and Petersen (2013) posit the individuals 
are motivated by an historically built psychological attitude towards hunger. 
 
Nesting Comparative Case Study Research into the Lakatosian Research Program 
After having introduced Lakatos’ philosophy of science and its main concept, namely the 
research program, as a way in which science evolves and also as a series of guidelines to 
assay a body of theories two points deserve further attention. Lakatos’ (1970) philosophy of 
science has already been mentioned in social research both in methodological (Hall, 2003; 
Hall, 2013; Hancké, 2009) as well as substantive works
ix. Nonetheless, very few works really 
unpack the concept of research program thus limiting the discussion to a cyclical view of 
research where theory and empirics interact between one anoth er. For instance,    the 
literature  has  hitherto paid  little  attention  to  the  concepts  of  theoretical  and  empirical 
progress. In fact, a new theory in order to be progressive should predict novel facts and find 
empirical confirmation. Although confusion prevails over the term  "novel fact"  this work 
employs the definition put forward by Lakatos, Worrall, and Currie (1980) and used in Elman 
and Elman (2003b) . A fact is defined as novel in that it does not play a role in the 
development of the theory. In other words, explaining the aberrant fact for T 1  does  not 
suffice for T2 to lead to theoretical progress. Furthermore, the novel facts predicted by T2 
must find empirical confirmation. Nonetheless, there is agreement among scholars that the 
empirical test of the new theory can be partial or at least provided at a later stage. 
 
Secondly,  this  work  aims  to  link  together  epistemology,  methodology  and  methods.  The 
argument put forward in this section is that comparative case study research in its concept 
formation methodology  is functional  to  the  theoretical  progress  in  the  research  program, 
namely  to  the  identification  and  prediction  of  novel  facts,  whereas  in  its  inferential  
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methodology  to  the  empirical  progress,  namely  the  confirmation  of  the  new  theory.  The 
discussion commences with concept formation being logically prior to causal inference
x.  
The Millian methods perform different but complementary functions when used as concept 
formation tools. They can, indeed, be placed on different levels on what Sartori (1970) terms 
the ladder of abstraction thus allowing the researcher to climb it. The MD method arguably 
develops concepts per genus et differentiam  resulting in what George and Bennett (2005) 
define as middle range typological theories. As illustrated in Figure 3, starting from the genus 
T1, which contains the concepts IV2 and IV3 and DV, the researcher re-categorises such a 
genus according to the new categorisation X1 identifying thus the new concept IV1. In other 
words,  through  the  MD  method  the  researcher  differentiates  the  genus  T1  into  a  new 
categorisation by altering the assumptions of the protective belt of T1. The result is a middle 
range categorical theory in the form ‘if X1 then IV1 causes DV, if non-X1 then IV2 (and/or IV3) 
causes DV’. It should be noticed that at this stage the concepts IV1, IV2 and IV3 and DV have 
similar characteristics in terms of extension and intension. Then, by applying the MA method 
the author reconciles the new categorisation into a new genus T2 (containing the concepts X1 
and Y). By comparing similar instances the researcher excludes everything different from the 
concept X1 and Y: he or she creates the new genus T2 (and the related concepts X1 and Y) 
ex adverso, namely by negation (Sartori, 1970).  
 
Sartori (1970 p.1044) argues that medium level categories (what George and Bennett, 2005, 
defines  middle  range  typological  theories)  are  created  through  ‘comparisons  among 
relatively  homogenous contexts’.  As  seen  above,  the  homogeneity  (i.e.  comparability) of 
cases is dictated by the genus T1. In doing so, the researcher compares cases belonging to 
the same genus in order to identify the aberrant facts which do not fit that genus and the 
related  concepts  (A  and  B  in  the  figures).  Then,  he/she  goes  further  by  identifying  and 
altering the assumptions of the protective belt on which T1 relies: the categorisation X1 in 
Figure 3. Then, the researcher moves forward by comparing similar cases according to the 
new concept X1. In other words, he/she defines the new genus T2 (and the related concepts) 
by negation. The result is the genus T2 characterised by concepts, such as X1 and Y, with 
less intension and more extension (Sartori, 1970) then those at the basis of the genus T1, 
such as IV2, IV3 and DV. As a conclusion, the genus T2 brings theoretical progress to the 
research program. 
 
The comparative methods as inferential tools make research progress empirically according 
to the guidelines set out by the Lakatosian philosophy of science. Indeed, it theoretically 
guides the researcher on the comparability of cases as well as it leaves the full burden of the 
empirical confirmation  of the new theory T2  to  future endeavours
xi.  Differently from what  
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argued by the literature cases are not comparable per se, maybe because they represent 
countries in the same geographical area (Lijphart, 1971). As claimed by Bloch (1934) ‘the 
unity of place is disorder [...] only the unity of problem makes a centre’ (in Skocpol and 
Somers, 1980 p.194): what makes cases comparable is the fact that they can be compared 
by using concepts belonging to the same genus (Sartori, 1970), namely they are comparable 
according  to  the  theory  T1  the  researcher  addresses.  This  attenuates  the  issue  of 
overdetermination,  namely  the  risk  of  falsely  rejecting  a  true  hypothesis,  in  that  the 
researcher implicitly compares his/her own cases with the hypothetical population of cases 
identified by the theory T1. As applied to Figure 2, the researcher implicitly compares the 
cases A and B with the population of cases which includes also the case C which in turn 
allows to control for IV0. Otherwise, if IV0 does not belong to the genus T1 the researcher is 
not interested in controlling for it in that it falls outside the scope of the research program. 
In this vein, Figure 2 shows the application of the MD method: in this case the researcher 
can  affirm  that  the  independent  variable  IV1  causes  the  dependent  variable  DV  by 
eliminating the potential explanations offered by T1 (i.e. IV2, IV3 and IV4). The use of the MA 
method would lead to the failure in rejecting the false hypotheses that DV and IV2 IV3 and IV4 
are related, as shown in Figure 1. This demonstrates that equifinality and the related risk of 
failing to reject a false hypothesis can be overcome with the help of the MD method. Figure 1 
shows the application of the MA method, which demonstrates that X1 (and not X2 or X3) 
causes Y. It should be noticed that, as demonstrated above, the concepts (or variables in 
this case) X1 and Y contain the concepts (or variables) IV1, IV2 IV3 and DV. Accordingly, not 
only is the progress made by the research theoretically but also empirically. Indeed, theory 
T2, which claims a causal relationship between X1 and Y, is more explanatorily powerful than 
theory  T1  in  that  it  explains  the  relationship  between  IV2,  IV3  and  DV  but  also  the  one 
between  IV1  and  DV,  for  instance.  As  seen  above,  the  concepts  X1  and  Y  are  more 
extensive than IV1, IV2, IV3 and DV. Furthermore, the new theory T2 finds (partial) empirical 
support. 
 
Before  proceeding  to  an  example  of  how  to  apply  the  Lakatosian  research  program  to 
comparative case study research, a consideration on causal inference is needed. Apart from 
few notable ground breaking works at the very beginning of 2000s (Goldthorpe, 2001), one 
of the main contributions of the new methodology has been a revamped attention to causal 
inference  in  the  2010s.  The  new  methodology  literature  (Collier,  2011;  Collier,  Brady,  & 
Seawright, 2010a; Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2010b; Gerring, 2008; Hall, 2013; Mahoney, 
2010) identifies two main modes of causal inference in qualitative research: covarational and 
mechanismic. Those two modes of causal inference entail different pieces of evidence and 
they are related to different methods. A mechanismic mode of causal inference relies on  
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causal  process  observations  as  the  main  type  of  evidence  (Collier,  2011;  Collier  et  al., 
2010a; Collier et al., 2010b) and it is underpinned by within case analysis, namely process 
tracing  (George  &  Bennett,  2005).  Conversely,  a  covarational  mode  of  causal  inference 
relies  on  more  traditional  data  set  observations  (Collier  et  al.,  2010b)  and  it  is  used  by 
comparative case study research, as used in this work. As done in Figure 1 and Figure 2, 
cases  are  divided  into  variables  or  factors  (what  Rihoux  &  Ragin,  2009,  term  a 
configurational approach) and those which co-vary or those which do not are considered to 
be associated.  
 
The  Political  Economy  of  Corporate  Governance  as  a  Research  Program  and 
Comparative Case Study Research 
This section provides another example of a research program in social research, namely the 
political  economy  of  corporate  governance,  and  it  shows  how  theoretical  and  empirical 
progress can be achieved by using the Millian methods in the two methodologies introduced 
above, namely concept formation and causal inference. The choice of this research program 
as an example is dictated by the illustrative purposes of this section. Indeed, a single work, 
namely Culpepper’s (2011) Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe 
and Japan, employs both the MD method and the MA method in order to bring theoretical 
and  empirical  progress  in  that  research  programme.  Accordingly,  that  work  perfectly 
exemplifies the link between epistemology, methodology and methods on which this work 
focuses. 
 
Culpepper’s (2011) work investigates the corporate governance reform in Germany, France, 
Netherlands and Japan
xii by starting from a specific aspect: the market for corporate control. 
The latter refers to the role of the equity market in corporate takeovers, namely whether the 
acquisition of a company follows exclusively economic rules or it is regulated by law, for 
instance. The major theories at the time of writing were the partisan theory (Cioffi & Höpner, 
2006) and the coalitional theory (T1) (Gourevitch & Shinn, 2005), which emphasised the role 
of partisanship (IV2) and the role of cross-class coalitions (IV3) in the creation of a passive 
market for corporate control (DV). In other words, those markets where (at least certain) 
companies  could  not  be  acquired  through  the  equity  market,  namely  by  simply  buying 
shares, such as in Germany and Netherlands, were explained by focusing on the economic 
policy promoted by social democratic parties in power and on the role of trade unions in 
defending firms against liberalisation. Nonetheless, those two theories could not explain the 
increase in hostile takeovers in some countries, such as in France, and not in others, such 
as in Germany, as a consequence of the financial globalisation in the 1990s (the aberrant 
fact, namely cases A and B in figures). The in-depth analysis of those cases conducted by  
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the  researcher  led  to  the  discovery  of  the  aberrant  fact  for  the  theory  T1  and  to  the 
identification of an alternative explanation: the difference in managers’ preferences between 
countries (IV1). This explanation was formulated thanks to the use of the MD method by 
comparing the French and German reforms of the market for corporate control
xiii (or lack of 
in the latter) in the 1990s (i.e. the cases A and B) where the preferences of managers (IV1) 
differed but where partisanship (IV2) and cross-class coalitions (IV3) did not play a role and 
where different outcomes (DV) (consistent with managers’ preferences) occurred.  
 
The researcher went further by altering the assumptions of the protective belt on which T1 
relied,  namely  that  political  institutions  always  matter,  and  identifies  the  factor  X1:  issue 
salience. The result was a middle range theory: where issue salience is low (X1) managers’ 
preferences  (IV1)  determine  the  reform  of  the  market  for  corporate  control  (DV).  The 
concepts  that  were  part  of  that  middle  range  theory  were  elaborated  per  genus  et 
differentiam, namely by differentiating the  categorization of  concepts according to a new 
genus, namely the theory T2. This re-categorization of T1 led the author to the theory T2 
characterised by more extensive concepts: issue salience (X1) and the political economy of 
corporate governance reform (Y)
xiv. In order to investigate that hypothesis and to generate a 
new universal theory the use of the  MA method was necessary. Thus the level of analysis 
was shifted away from the market for corporate control in Germany and France and to the 
reform of politi cal economy of corporate governance. By eliminating all the differences 
between  France  and  Germany,  mainly  the  political  economic  institutions  such  as  the 
electoral system (majoritarian v. proportional), the mode of interest representation (pluralist 
v. neo-corporatism) and the variety of capitalism (liberal market economy v. coordinated 
market economy), the researcher concludes that issue salience is related to business power 
in corporate governance reform. It should be noticed that the latter is a more ex tensive and 
less intensive concept than the reform of market for corporate control. The finding was that 
regardless the individual country (or the issue at stake) managers co -opt the decision-
making process when the salience of an issue is low: this is an  ex adverso definition. The 
author identified a universal theory T 2: ‘the theory of quiet politics implies that the political 
power of organized business is insensitive to the differences among the political institutions 
of advanced democracies’  (Culpepper,  2011 p.179). Table 2 summarizes that two stage 
process. In conclusion, T2 represents a progress in the research program being explanatorily 
more powerful than T1 in that relying on more extensive concepts and being also (partially) 
empirically supported by evidence. 
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First of all, it should be noticed that the theory of quiet politics does not modify the hard core 
thus  respecting  the  negative  heuristic:  the theory  assumes  rational  and  utility  maximiser 
actors, as it is the case for political economy. It is argued that business rationally adapts its 
lobbying strategies according to the institutional arena and whether the issues gains public 
and  political  attention.    In  this  vein,  it  is  similar  to  the  coalitional  and  partisan  theories. 
Furthermore,  it  follows  the  positive  heuristic  of  the  political  economy  of  corporate 
governance,  namely  the  explanation  of  corporate  governance  reforms  in  advanced 
democracies.  Nonetheless,  the  theory  of  quiet  politics  modifies  the  assumptions  in  the 
protective belt on which T1 relied, namely the fact that different institutions always incentivise 
different patterns of behaviour. Furthermore, T2 represents a genuine theoretical progress in 
that not only does it explain the aberrant facts which the old theories could not account for 
but it also explains something more. That theory predicts that issue salience (X1) determines 
the  political  power  of  organised  business  in  corporate  governance  reform  (Y).  If  issue 
salience  (X1)  is  high  the  role  of  partisanship  (IV2)  or  of  broader  societal  actors  (IV3) 
determine the reform of the market for corporate control (DV), as claimed by T1. Yet, the 
theory  T2  explains  also  the  scenario  when  issue  salience  is  low,  namely  that  organised 
business  (IV1)  determines  the  reform  of  the  market  for  corporate  control  (DV).  In  other 
words, it also explains the increase in hostile takeovers in countries, such as France, which 
the previous theories could not account for. On top of that, that theory explains also other 
aspects of corporate governance which are not used in its construction and which is not 
explained  by  the  previous  theories:  for  instance,  the  reform  in  executive  pay  in  several 
countries in the 1990s, as demonstrated by Culpepper (2011) in the last section of the book. 
 
Conclusion 
In this work I argue that in order to fully exploit the comparative case study methods in social 
sciences the researcher has to take clear stances at the epistemological level and, relatedly, 
at  the  methodological  level.  The  link  between  epistemology,  methodology  and  methods 
needs to be substantiated. The Millian comparative methods allow research to progress both 
theoretically and empirically according to the research program. The latter represents the 
core  tenet  of  Lakatos’  philosophy  of  science  and  it  sets  out  a  series  of  epistemological 
guidelines according to which science (should) evolves. In their two methodological variants 
the Millian comparative methods provide the concept formation tools necessary to formulate 
a more theoretically powerful new theory as well as the inferential tools to (partially) confirm 
that theory. 
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Three conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, the discussion of the application of the Millian 
methods in social research demonstrates how the method of agreement (MA) is not inferior 
to  the  method  of  difference  (MD)  as  sustained  by  the  literature.  Rather,  they  perform 
complementary functions indispensable to the researcher. Secondly and accordingly, the 
researcher  can  provide  any  body  of  literature  with  a  substantial  contribution  by  using 
comparative  case  study  research.  Last  but  not  least,  this  work  is  in  line  with  the  new 
methodology literature which have recently argued in favour of the academic dignity of case 
study research. Rather, I conclude this work with a provocative claim: if used singularly and 
not  in  combination,  comparative  case  study  research  is  methodologically  superior  to  its 
quantitative nemesis, namely statistical research. The former, indeed, is methodologically 
functional to theoretical progress  as well as empirical progress whereas the latter whilst 
performing better in empirical progress is not functional to theoretical progress at all. The 
reason  being  that  although  statistical  research  can  better  cope  with  issues  such  as 
overdetermination  and  equifinality  thus  providing  a  theory  with  a  more  sound  empirical 
investigation it does not perform a function which is crucial for the progress of research, 
namely concept formation.    
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Figure 1. The MA Method. 
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Table 1. The MD and the MA Methods: a Comparison. 
  MD  MA 
Scope of claim  Internal validity  External validity 
Content of claim  Necessary cause  Sufficient cause 
Cause of an outcome  Outcome of a cause 
Practical considerations    Low variance in the outcome 
(e.g. rare events) 
Type of variance  Temporal   Spatial  
Main issue  Overdetermination  Equifinality 
 
    
Figure 3. The Research Program. 
 
   
Universal theory 
T1: IV2 (or IV3, 
IV4) causes DV 
A and B do not fit 
T1 
Identification and 
alteration of the 
protective belt 
(factor  X1) 
Middle range 
theory:  if X1 then  
IV1 causes DV 
Universal theory 
T2:  X1 causes Y   
Table 2. The MD v. MA Methods: an Example. 
MD  French reform of the market 
for corporate control in 
1990s 
German reform of the market 
for corporate control in 1990s 
Corporate governance 
reform 
1 – reform  0 - no reform 
Managers’ preferences  1 -managers’ preferences in 
favour of reform 
0- managers’ preferences 
against reform 
Societal actors  0- no role of cross-class 
coalitions 
0- no role of cross-class 
coalitions 
Partisanship  0- no role of parties  0- no role of parties 
     
MA  Corporate governance reform  Corporate governance reform  
Business power in policy 
change 
1-business power  1-business power 
Salience  1-low salience  1 -low salience 
VoC  0-LME  1-CME 
Electoral system  1-majoritarian  0-proportional 
Mode of interest 
representation 
1-pluralism  0-neocorporatism 
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i Although I acknowledge that the clear definition of concepts is indispensable in any type of research, the argument is that 
differently from large N studies based on statistical analysis, for instance, comparative case study research can perform the 
concept  formation  function  along  with  the  inferential  one  common  to  any  other  method.  Indeed,  only  the  in-depth 
description of how a political or social phenomenon occurs in a given setting combined with the comparison of that instance 
with another in place in another setting can include all the relevant characteristics of that phenomenon and exclude all others. 
Accordingly, I argue that researchers should exploit this comparative advantage of comparative case study research also 
because categorisation is the condicio sine qua non for inferring causal relationships in social research (Sartori, 1970) 
ii Gerring (2007) identifies nine ways to select cases, all of which are based on the relationship between the case(s) and the 
population of interest. 
iii Other than their popularity in social science research, two other factors make the focus on those two methods relevant. 
Firstly, the combination of the method of agreement and the method of different represents an effective and efficient way to 
infer causal relations, as argued below. Secondly, they are the basis of the configurational/covarational approach to case 
study research, which is used also by more nuanced methods, such as Ragin’s (1987) Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA).  
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iv The discussion on those methods is contained in chapter 8 ‘Of The Four Methods Of Experimental Inquiry’ of book III. I 
acknowledge that in that chapter Mill (1888) introduces two other methods: the method of concomitant variations and the 
method  of  residues.  Nonetheless,  the  former  lies  on  the  quantification  of  factors,  which  is  logically  posterior  to  their 
identification and categorization (Sartori, 1970, George & Bennett, 2005), and the latter represents a way to combine the 
results obtained through other inferential methods. Accordingly, being both logically and analytically posterior to the method 
of agreement and the method of difference they arguably do not deserve a separate discussion in this work. 
v According to the literature the issue of low degrees of freedom and the risk of overdetermination characterizes comparative 
case study research in general and thus also the MD method. Nonetheless, equifinality and the risk of failing to reject a false 
null hypothesis is specific to the MD method and arguably more problematic. This is why the discussion of those two issues 
is kept separated in this section. 
vi The null hypothesis in this case is that a relation is present between X 0 and Y. As show in Figure 1, no relationship is 
present thus showing that this hypothesis is false. 
vii Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987, Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) represents a development of Mill’s (1888) 
method of residues mentioned above. In this vein, it allows the researcher to overcome some shortcomings inherent to the 
traditional Millian comparative methods by accounting for complex causality as well as conjecturally sufficient and 
necessary causes. 
viii Instead of epistemology some scholars (Elman & Elman, 2003a) use the term metatheory to indicate a set of standards to 
assay theories, such as the ones provided by the Lakatosian philosophy of science. 
ix For a thorough list of works which claim to use Lakatos’s philosophy of science in International Relations see Elman and 
Elman (2003b, p.50-61) 
x Along with the attention on causal inference mentioned below another main achievement of the new methodology literature 
is the revamped attention on concept formation (Mahoney, 2010). By relying on Boolean  algebra Goertz (2006) identifies 
two types of concept formation: the inclusive one associated with Sartori’s (1970) work and the exclusive one associated 
with the philosopher Wittgenstein (1958). This work employs the former being more familiar to social science research. 
xi As mentioned above, it should be noticed that from a Lakatosian view of research a research program is progressive if it is 
theoretically progressive, namely its explanatory power is higher than the previous theory T 2 but only partially empirically 
progressive. 
xii  I acknowledge that Culpepper (2011)   complements the covarational/configurational comparative case study research 
showed in this section with within case analysis, namely process tracing. Nonetheless, the latter arguably provides only 
additional leverage to the main research design which is based on comparative case study research. 
xiii As stated above, cases are instances of a phenomenon which  are spatially and temporally bounded according to the 
theory. In this vein, cases in this first part are instances of reforms of the market for corporate control which took place  in in 
Germany and France in the 1990s. 
xiv It should be noticed how both the research question and cases are different with respect to the previous part. Indeed, the 
research question in this second part is what determines business power in the reform of corporate governance in 
contemporary democracies and thus cases are represented by the reforms of corporate governance in Germany and France. 